We analyze implications of in ‡ation persistence for business cycle dynamics following terms of trade and risk-premium shocks in a small open economy, under …xed and ‡exible exchange rate regimes. We show that the country's adjustment paths are slow and cyclical if there is a signi…cant backward-looking element in the in ‡ation dynamics and the exchange rate is …xed. We also show that such cyclical adjustment paths are moderated if there is a high proportion of forward-looking price setters. In contrast, with an independent monetary policy, ‡exible exchange rate allows to escape severe cycles, supporting the conventional wisdom about the insulation role of ‡exible exchange rates.
Introduction
The debate regarding the choice of an exchange rate regime is very old, and yet it remains to be controversial. The theoretical literature provides broad guidance on the choice of exchange rate. Much of the modern analysis of choosing an exchange rate regime goes back to the works of Friedman (1953) , Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962) . Friedman (1953) made the modern case for a ‡exible exchange rate: a ‡exible exchange rate is desirable in the face of real country-speci…c shocks that require adjustment in relative prices between countries, because nominal prices are highly in ‡exible. However, if prices are ‡exible, the choice of exchange rate is irrelevant as adjustment in relative prices can happen either via changes in the nominal exchange rate or prices.
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Friedman's analysis has been extended by Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962) to a world of capital mobility 1 . Following their work, one of an important considerations in the choosing of an exchange rate regime have become the nature and source of the shocks to the economy and the degree of capital mobility. In general, a …xed exchange rate in an open economy with capital mobility is preferable if the shocks bu¤eting the economy are predominantly monetary, such as changes in the demand for money. A ‡exible exchange rate is preferable if shocks are predominantly real, such as changes in technology or tastes 2 .
The emergence of an important strand of macroeconomics, called New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) 3 , enabled analysis of the design of monetary policy and the choice of exchange rate in an open economy within stochastic, sticky-price general equilibrium optimizing models. General equilibrium sticky-models, based on utility maximization, allow to examine welfare consequences of alternative monetary rules. Now there is a lengthy literature that studies the performance of monetary rules (optimal or not) in open economies 4 . From traditional NOEM models the general consensus has emerged that countries should allow their exchange rates to ‡oat freely and use monetary policy to target some measure of in ‡ation.
Despite the insulating role of ‡exible exchange rates in open-economies in the face of real shocks, greater …xity of exchange rate may be justi…ed on many grounds. For example, in many small open economies exports, imports and international capital ‡ows represent a large share of their economies, so large variations in the exchange rate can cause very large variations in the real economy. Another argument in favor of greater …xity of the exchange rate is the liability dollarization -phenomenon, which is characterized by external net liabilities denominated in dollars and revenues generated in local currency. In this case, a sharp real exchange rate depreciation causes a decline in the net worth of corporations and individuals, leading to a sharp decline in lending and hence economic contraction. This situation can be exacerbated in the presence of …nancial imperfections, which can arise from informational asymmetries or institutional shortcomings, and which imply that borrowers face constraints. In this case, the contractionary e¤ect of an exchange rate depreciation works through the negative …nancial accelerator channel, which links the condition of the borrower's balance sheets with the terms of credit. A sharp depreciation, which reduces earnings of …rms and deteriorates their balance sheets, decreases …rms'capacities to borrow and invest. This discussion suggests that …nancial vulnerability is a su¢ cient reason for abandoning a ‡oating exchange rate in favor of a more …xed rate. However, a number of papers that incorporate the …nancial accelerator mechanism in general equilibrium setting with nominal rigidities (e.g., Céspedes et al., (2000) , Gertler et 1 See Bordo (2003) for survey of the issues relating to exchange rate regime choice in historical perspective. 2 When shocks come from the money market, a country bene…ts from a …xed-rate regime. The shock would be absorbed through purchases and sales of foreign exchange by the monetary authority, which would a¤ect the money supply, maintain a …xed exchange rate, and keep real output una¤ected. With sticky wages and prices, countries that are subject to real shocks are better o¤ with a ‡exible exchange rate. In the face of negative real shocks, a depreciation of the exchange rate would reduce the price of tradable goods and ensure expenditure switching from more expensive foreign goods to relatively cheaper domestically produced goods, and thus o¤set the negative e¤ect of the shock. 3 Literature survey, see Lane (2001) 4 Aoki ( Devereux et al. (2004) ) claim that the presence of such …nancial frictions amplify the business cycle, but do not alter conventional wisdom that ‡exible exchange rate are less contractionary than …xed rates and ‡exible exchange rates are optimal from a welfare point of view.
One feature that characterizes most of the models discussed above is the entirely forwardlooking nature of price setting behavior 5 . The models of these papers specify nominal rigidities by assuming a time-contingent staggered Calvo (1983) price setting mechanism that generates a standard forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) 6 . The forward-looking nature of the NKPC, in turn, implies a great deal of ‡exibility for the dynamics of in ‡ation. This, however, is in contrast with empirical evidence, which suggests that in ‡ation is highly persistent 7 . In this paper we develop a dynamic general equilibrium small open-economy model, where in ‡ation persistence is incorporated via introduction of rule-of-thumb price setting. We use this model to study the e¤ects of such backward-looking behavior on dynamic adjustment in response to the shocks. The paper aims to explore the implications of in ‡ation inertia for business cycle dynamics in the face of terms of trade and risk-premium shocks. In our framework, nominal and real exchange rates play a central role in the adjustment process when prices are sticky. Therefore, our discussion focuses on the question of the insulating properties of alternative exchange rate regimes. We study two commonly-used monetary policies: a …xed exchange rate (when the monetary authority stabilizes the nominal exchange rate) and a ‡exible exchange rate (when the central bank stabilizes in ‡ation).
Our paper is related to two strands of the literature. The …rst is one that studies performance of simple monetary rules (whether optimal or not) in a dynamic New Keynesian framework, brie ‡y discussed above. The second focuses on empirical evidence of in ‡ation persistence, its determinants and implications for a design of monetary policy.
As we have noted earlier, most of the papers within the literature on the performance of monetary rules in open economies focus on a standard forward-looking Phillips curve that exhibits no intrinsic persistence. However, there are many more models that incorporate in ‡ation persistence into stochastic general equilibrium settings with nominal rigidities to study di¤erent issues (e.g., Christiano et al. (2001) , Leitemo (2002) , Benigno and Thoenissen (2003) , Smets and Wouters (2002) ). Our paper is probably closest to Leitemo (2002) , who analyzes the insulating role of alternative monetary policy regimes for di¤erent degrees of in ‡ation persistence. Contrary to our paper, Leitemo illustrates the signi…cance of di¤erent monetary policy regimes, both for a reduction of volatility in key macro variables in the face of shocks and for welfare (we, however, do not look at welfare). In particular, Leitemo …nds that social loss under di¤erent monetary regimes is lower when there is less in ‡ation persistence, and perhaps the most important …nding is that the currency-board arrangement (as well as the exchange-rate targeting regime) achieves the greatest improvement in terms of a social loss as in ‡ation becomes more forward-looking. 5 Some research from the late 1990s has disregarded the forward-looking term in the Philips curve and focused on entirely backward-looking speci…cation of the curve (see for example Svensson (1997) and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) ). However this research is not set in a micro-founded framework. 6 See the analysis and discussion related to the New Keynesian model in Clarida et al. (1999) , who also provide references to the extensive literature related to this model. 7 See Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Galí and Gertler (1999) , Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2002) , Mehra (2004) However, it is important to note that, his model is a one-sector model, which embodies some microfoundations and adheres to non-structural arguments in representing persistence in in ‡ation and output. Our paper is also related to a lengthy literature that analyzes implications of in ‡ation inertia for a design of monetary policy 8 . Within this strand of the literature there is a large body of research that investigates the implications of in ‡ation persistence in the context of a monetary union. Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2002) analyze di¤erent in ‡ation targeting policies under the presence of heterogeneity in in ‡ation dynamics across euro area countries. By using, a micro-founded New Keynesian framework, they evaluate the welfare implications of di¤erent in ‡ation targeting policies. A vital complement to work by Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2002) of investigation of optimal policies is an analysis of the stability of models under particular policy regimes, which have been thoroughly examined in a monetary union by Kirsanova et al. (2006) . They show how members of the monetary union can be vulnerable to cyclical instability and show how the active use of …scal policy can be used to mitigate or avoid this problem. Kirsanova et al. (2006a) also demonstrate that a higher proportion of forward-looking price setters moderate destabilizing e¤ects following asymmetric shocks in the monetary union. These results agree with Westaway (2003) and Allsopp and Vines (2006) , who also point out that a destabilizing tendency in the monetary union following shocks can be aggravated by more signi…cant backward-looking element in in ‡ation behavior. Analogous to their work, our paper aims to analyze dynamic adjustment in the face of external shocks in a small open economy, where backward-looking behavior is introduced. In ‡ation in the country is governed by a Phillips curve, that may be either backward-looking (accelerationist) or forward-looking (New Keynesian). We deliberately focus on these two limiting speci…cations of the Phillips curve to examine how backward-looking behavior changes the propagation of the shocks to the economy compared with a forward-looking speci…cation, which has been extensively studied in the literature. We perform our analysis under two exchange rate regimes, a …xed rate and a ‡exible exchange rate, which allows us to discuss whether a small open economy will bene…t from a ‡exible exchange rate in the presence of a substantial fraction of backward-looking price setters.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and de…nes a competitive equilibrium for the economy. Section 3 discusses calibration of the model. We discuss the simulation results in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Model of a Small Open Economy
We consider a two sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities. The domestic economy is open and small and comprises three sectors: traded, non-traded goods, and the oil sector. We assume that oil production requires no domestic factor inputs, and all of its production is exported. The exogenous price of oil is subject to stochastic shocks. Our model assumes ‡exible price traded goods, traded in competitive markets, and a continuum of monopolistically produced non-traded goods. We assume Calvo-type price stickiness in the non-traded sector. While most of the papers that use the small open economy framework embody nominal inertia in terms of the form of Calvo contracts, we also allow for some additional in ‡ation inertia, using a rule-of-thumb price setting mechanism outlined in Steinsson (2003) . Domestic households consume both non-traded and traded goods. Traded goods could also be invested and imported from the rest of the world. Non-traded goods are also used to meet capital installation costs, which are a composite of both non-traded and traded goods in the same mix as the household's consumption basket. Households own production …rms, supply labor and accumulate capital that they rent to production …rms. As the owners of the …rms producing non-traded goods, households also receive the income corresponding to the monopolistic rents generated by these …rms. Non-traded goods …rms produce di¤erentiated varieties of non-traded goods. We consider two alternative monetary policy regimes: ‡exible and …xed exchange rate regimes. In both cases the monetary authority uses the nominal interest rate as a policy instrument and monetary policy is modeled through an interest rate rule.
Consumers
Consider a small open economy with non-traded goods, traded goods and oil. The economy is inhabited by a continuum of households with mass 1. The representative consumer has preferences given by:
where C t is a composite consumption index and H t is the labor supply. We assume the following functional form of utility function u:
Composite consumption is a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function of traded goods and non-traded goods, with
with C N;t and C T;t being indexes of consumption of non-traded and traded goods respectively. Under such speci…cation of the composite consumption function, the parameter measures the (inverse) intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the parameter is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between non-traded and traded goods. The implied consumer price index is then
where P N;t is the price index of the composite di¤erentiated non-traded good, P T;t is the price of ‡exible-price traded good, expressed in national currency, and P t is the consumer price index. 9 9 The price index Pt is the minimum expenditure required to purchase one unit of aggregate consumption good Indexes of consumption of non-traded goods, in turn, is given by CES aggregators of the quantities consumed of each variety, with elasticity of substitution across di¤erent categories equal to :
where C N;t (j) is consumption of variety j by the representative household. When tends to in…nity all varieties are perfect substitutes for each other. The price of variety j is denoted P N;t (j), and the price of a consumption basket of non-traded goods P N;t is de…ned as a CES index 10 with elasticity 1= :
The optimal allocation of any given expenditure on non-traded goods yields the total demand for variety j 2 [0; 1] :
Households may borrow and lend in the form of non state-contingent bonds that are denominated in units of the traded goods. We assume that the borrowing rate i F t ; charged on foreign debt depends on an exogenous world interest rate, i ; and exogenous term t that capture external shocks to the borrowing rate:
The exogenous part of the foreign rate t follows a partial adjustment process:
Observe that in this paper we do not endogenize the interest rate, and do not use other methods (…nitely-lived households, transactions costs in foreign assets, endogenous discount factor 11 ) to rule out the nonstationary behavior of consumption and the current account. The nonstationary behavior of variables implies that unconditional variances do not exist, which poses problems for business cycle analysis. However, we are not interested in such analysis. In addition, the non-endogenized speci…cation of foreign interest rate allows us to compare our results with the real business cycle (RBC) analogue of the model of this paper, discussed in Kuralbayeva and Vines (2006) , which also assumes an interest rate speci…cation similar to (2.5). Households can also obtain loans from domestic capital markets, with B t the stock of domestic currency debt.
Households own …rms that produce two goods: traded and non-traded goods in the economy. Households accumulate capital and rent it out to the goods producing …rms. Capital stocks in non-traded and traded sectors are assumed to evolve according to the following: 
where investment in both sectors is traded good. Installation of capital in both sectors requires adjustment costs, which represent a basket of goods composed of non-traded goods and traded goods in the same mix as the household's consumption basket. We de…ne capital adjustment costs as:
where i = N; T; so 0 > 0; and 00 > 0:
The household's budget constraint in nominal terms is:
where W t is the wage rate; R N t and R T t are the nominal rates of return for households in the non-traded and traded sectors respectively; D t is the outstanding amount of foreign debt, denominated in foreign currency, B t is the stock of domestic debt, denominated in domestic currency, and S t is the nominal exchange rate expressed as units of domestic currency needed for one unit of foreign currency. The household owns K N;t and K T;t units of capital in the non-traded and traded sectors, makes additional investments in both sectors of I N;t and I T;t , consumes C t and supplies H t units of labor, and receives pro…ts from the …rms producing the non-traded goods,
The household optimum is characterized by the following equations:
(2.14)
along with the capital accumulation, (2.7)-(2.8), and budget constraint, (2.9), equations. Equation (2.10) equates the marginal disutility of the labor e¤ort to the utility value of the wage rate, and de…nes the households labor supply curve. Equation (2.11) is a Euler equation that determines intertemporal allocation: it equates the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption to the real rate of return on domestic bonds. Equation (2.13) is the counterpart of equation (2.12) for foreign bonds. Equation (2.13) is the pricing condition for physical capital in the non-traded sector. It equates the revenue from selling one unit of capital today (q N t ), to the discounted value of renting the unit of capital for one period, and then selling it, R N;t+1 + q N t+1 ; net of depreciation and adjustment costs 12 . Equation (2.14) relates the cost of producing a unit of capital in the non-traded sector to the shadow price of installed capital, or Tobin's Q, q N t : Equations (2.15), and (2.16) are the traded sector counterparts of (2.13) and (2.14). Equation (2.11) in conjunction with (2.12) yields the uncovered interest parity condition (UIP):
Given a decision on consumption C t the household allocates optimally the expenditure on C N;t and C T;t by minimizing the total expenditure P t C t under the constraint (2.2), so demands for non-traded and traded goods are:
Production by Firms
We assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive …rms of measure unity in the non-traded sector, each producing output with the production function:
where A N is a productivity parameter, which is the same across the …rms in the non-traded sector. Firms in the traded sector operate under perfect competition with the production function given by: where A T is a productivity parameter, and is also the same across the …rms in the traded sector. There are also a mass of one of …rms producing traded goods. We assume all …rms rent capital and labor in perfectly competitive factor markets. Cost minimization implies equations:
where
are aggregate supply functions of non-traded and traded goods 13 . Demand for labor and capital in the non-traded goods sector is described by equations (2.22)-(2.23), where M C N;t represents the (nominal) marginal costs in that sector. It is noteworthy that the marginal costs in the non-traded sector are identical across …rms as long as their production functions exhibit constant returns to scale and prices of inputs are fully ‡exible in perfectly competitive markets. Producers of the traded goods are price-takers, so that equations (2.24)-(2.25) describe the demand for labor and capital inputs in the traded sector, with P T;t representing the unit cost of production.
Price setting in the non-traded sector
In order to describe the price setting decisions we split …rms into two groups according to their pricing behavior, following Steinsson (2003) . In each period, each …rm changes its price with probability 1 N , and otherwise, with probability N ; its price will rise at the steady state rate of in ‡ation N;t = P N;t =P N;t 1 . Among those …rms which reset their price, a proportion of 1 ! are forward-looking and set prices optimally, while a fraction ! are backward-looking and set their prices according to a rule of thumb.
Forward-looking …rms are pro…t-maximizing and reset prices (P F N;t ) optimally, which in terms of log-deviations from the steady state (see Technical appendix) implies:
where N;t is in ‡ation in the non-traded sector and c mc N;t stands for the deviation of real marginal costs from its steady state. As discussed in Christiano et al. (2001) , relation (2.26) shows several important features of the behavior of the forward-looking …rms. When …rms expect real marginal costs to be higher in the future and/or expect future increases in the price level, then the …rms set b p F N;t higher than c mc N;t : Christiano et al. (2001) describe this behavior as 'front loading'. Firms understand that they might not be allowed to change their price when higher real marginal costs or higher prices materialize. So, anticipating this, forward-looking …rms set prices to maximize their current and future pro…ts, taking into account the future evolution of real marginal costs and prices. Further, for derivation of the Phillips curve below, it is convenient to re-write relation (2.26) as:
Backward-looking …rms set their prices according to the following rule 14 :
where N;t 1 = P N;t 1 =P N;t 2 is the past period growth rate of prices in the non-traded sector, Y N;t 1 =Y n N;t 1 is output relative to the ‡exible-price equilibrium, P r N;t 1 is an index of prices set at date t 1, given in terms of log-deviations from the steady state (see Appendix) by:
The rule of thumb (2.28) shows that backward-looking …rms set their prices equal to the average of the newly set prices in the previous period updated by the previous period in ‡ation rate of the non-traded goods price level and by the deviation of the non-traded goods output relative to the ‡exible price equilibrium non-traded output. This assumption, as discussed in Galí and Gertler (1999) has the following appealing properties: …rst, the rule of thumb behavior converges to the optimal behavior over time; and second, P B N;t depends only on information up to the period t 1, but implicitly incorporates past expectations about the future, since the price index P r N;t 1 is partly determined by forward-looking price setters. For the whole non-traded sector, the price index in the non-traded sector is given by:
Following Steinsson (2003) , we can derive the following Phillips curve for the non-traded sector, written in terms of log-deviations from the steady state 15 :
where the coe¢ cients are:
and where b y N;t is the output gap in the non-traded sector, de…ned as the deviation from the ‡exible price output of the non-traded sector (Y n N;t ); and mc N;t are real marginal costs in the non-traded sector.
All coe¢ cients are explicit functions of three model parameters: N which measures the degree of price stickiness in the non-traded sector; ! which measures the degree of 'backwardness' in price setting, and the discount factor : Coe¢ cients on the output gaps, 1 and 2 ; also depend on the elasticity #: In this model, the degree of in ‡ation inertia can be measured by the fraction of backward-looking …rms, as a larger fraction of backward-looking …rms implies a higher value of the coe¢ cient of the lagged in ‡ation, b : As one would anticipate, a rise in ! leads to a fall in the coe¢ cients of current variables, 2 and mc , and to a rise in the coe¢ cient of the predetermined variable, 1 : Moreover, a higher degree of backwardness in the model implies a lower weight on the currently expected future in ‡ation, f : This is because only forward-looking …rms react immediately to changes in current market conditions.
Note that when ! = 0 the Phillips curve collapses to the standard forward-looking speci…-cation:
When ! = 1 the Phillips curve takes the speci…cation:
As noted in Steinsson (2003) , (2.33) has a unique bounded solution:
which is a form of the accelerationist Phillips curve and has no forward-looking component.
Local Currency Pricing
We assume that the price of the traded good is ‡exible and determined by the law of one price, so: P T;t = S t P T;t where P T;t is the foreign currency price of the traded good, and S t is the nominal exchange rate. The economy is small also in the respect that the economy's export share is negligible in the foreign aggregate price index, implying that the foreign price of traded goods is equal to the foreign aggregate price level, and we assume that it is equal to unity, so P T;t = P t = 1, and
De…ning the real exchange rate as, e t = S t P t =P t ; so the real exchange rate depreciates (appreciates) when e t rises (decreases). The rate of change of the real exchange rate is given as:
and the nominal exchange rate depreciation in period t is given by:
Monetary policy
We assume that the monetary authority uses the nominal interest rate as the policy instrument. We consider two alternative monetary policy regimes: ‡exible and …xed exchange rate regimes.
In the …rst, the ‡exible exchange rate regime monetary policy is characterized as a Taylor rule:
where N is the target for the annual in ‡ation in the non-traded sector, i is the stationary value of the interest rate, and Y N;t =Y n N;t is output of the non-traded sector relative to its ‡exible-price equilibrium. Log-linearization of the feedback rule yields:
where Y > 1; and > 0 are the reaction coe¢ cients on non-traded goods in ‡ation and b y N;t is the output gap in the non-traded sector.
Alternatively, monetary policy is characterized by the following interest rate rule that delivers a …xed exchange rate:
where ! S > 0; and S t = S 8t: Under this rule, the monetary authority pegs the nominal exchange rate at a target level S in all periods by varying the nominal interest rate in reaction to movements in the foreign interest rate and deviations of the nominal exchange rate from the target 16 .
Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the economy is a sequence of prices fÞ t g = fW t ; i Fsuch that:
(1) given a sequence of prices fÞ t g and a sequence of shocks, f h t g is a solution to the representative household's problem;
(2) given a sequence of prices fÞ t g and a sequence of shocks, f f t g is a solution to the representative …rms in non-traded and traded sectors; (3) given a sequence of quantities f t g and a sequence of shocks, fÞ t g clears the markets: (i) Labor market:
(iii) Non-traded goods sector:
where t is a measure of relative price dispersion in the non-traded goods sector 17 and Y D N t is the aggregate demand of non-traded goods in the economy, de…ned as:
(iv) Traded goods sector:
where domestic absorption of traded goods A T t is met via domestic production of traded goods Y T t and imports IM T t :
(v) Foreign loans market:
(vi) Domestic loans market:
(vii) Balance of Payments: 
Calibration
In calibrating the model one period is meant to be one quarter. The parameter choices of the model are described in Table 1, while Table 3 reports macroeconomic ratios implied by the theoretical model. We set the following parameters of the utility function: ; the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, equal to unity 18 ; the value of coe¢ cient on labor = 1; and = 0:45 19 ; so that elasticity of the labor supply is 2.22. The elasticity of substitution between non-traded and traded goods ( ) is set to 1.2. 20 We set the value of a, the share of non-traded goods in CPI, equal to 0.65, which implies the steady state share of non-traded goods in GDP is 45 percent. We set the depreciation rate at 10 percent per annum, a standard value in the business cycle literature. The value of the adjustment cost parameter, I is set at 0.1. This is consistent with empirical estimates of the adjustment cost parameter in the literature, although these estimates are for developed countries 21 .
We set the steady-state real interest rate faced by the small economy in international markets at 11 percent per annum, with a world interest rate r of 4 percent and a country premium of 7 percent. These parameters yield a value of the subjective discount factor, ; of 0.973. The steady state value of oil income, O, was chosen such that oil transfers constitute 25 percent of GDP. We also set the steady state value of foreign borrowing equal to 60 percent of GDP. The elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods is set to equal 11, which implies a steady state mark-up of 10%. This is within the range suggested by the literature. 22 Table 1 Calibration of the model 1 8 Ostry and Reinhart (1992) provides an estimate of for a group of Asian countries at 0.8. Aurelio (2005) uses the value of = 1 in her simulations. Gali and Monacelli (2002) assume log-utility of consumption, which also implies a unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 1 In our simulations, perhaps the most important variable is !; the proportion of rule-of-thumb price setters. As 0 6 ! 6 1; our model nests the purely forward-looking new Keynesian model (! = 0), the purely backward-looking acceleration model (! = 1), as well as other models such as in Fuhrer and Moore (1995) (0 < ! < 1): Empirical studies conclude that an empirical Phillips curve has a statistically signi…cant backward-looking component. The estimates of coe¢ cients on 'backwardness' and 'forwardness', however, vary widely among studies. Backward-looking behavior is of limited quantitative importance in the estimated speci…cations of Galí and Gertler (1999) and Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006). Mehra (2004) …nds an extremely backward-looking speci…cation of the Phillips curve, while Fuhrer and Moore (1995) claim that an equal weight on forward and backward in ‡ation terms matches the pattern of US data much better than either a purely backward-looking or purely forward-looking model. Galí and Gertler (1999) estimate a Phillips curve by using non-linear instrumental variables (GMM), using a measure of marginal costs instead of a measure of the output gap, which is a close relative of the Phillips curve derived in this model. In this paper, we are interested in analyzing how backward-looking behavior a¤ects adjustment dynamics in response to the shocks compared with forward-looking behavior. That is why we consider two limiting cases. In the …rst case, in ‡ation exhibits very little persistence and price setters are almost completely forward-looking, assuming ! = 0:01: In the second case, in ‡ation is almost completely persistent and we set ! = 0:9: These values of !, with the appropriate choice of elasticity #, imply the values of structural parameters of the Phillips curve, reported in Table 2 .
To calibrate the parameter #; we follow Steinsson's procedure, which is as follows. The value of ! varies between zero and one. So, when ! ! 0; it collapses to the familiar forwardlooking speci…cation N;t = N c mc N;t + E t N;t+1 ; whilst when ! ! 1; it collapses to t = t 1 + (1 N )#b y N;t 1 ; which is an accelerationist Phillips curve. In calibrating #; Steinsson assumes that demand pressure is the same across these two extreme cases, i.e. N = (1 N )#: Chosen in this way, # = (1 N )= N = 0.36. We follow the literature 24 in setting N = 0:75; which implies that, on average, prices last for one year.
In this paper we study a permanent improvement in the price of oil and a permanent reduction in the risk-premium. We do not examine the impact of productivity shocks and we set the values of the productivity parameters, A N and A X , in two sectors equal to unity. In the model, shocks to oil prices are represented by shocks to " t , and shocks to the risk premium are represented by shocks to t .
With the benchmark parameters summarized in the Table 1 the model generates an economy that has the following structure in the steady state: 
Flexible price equilibrium
The model collapses to the ‡exible price equilibrium in the case when …rms change their price with probability one, that is N = 1: We assume that in ‡exible price equilibrium there is no distinction between backward-looking and forward-looking …rms, product markets are monopolistically competitive and …rms set prices as a mark-up over marginal costs.
Monetary policy consistent with a ‡exible price equilibrium can be found by substituting the paths for in ‡ation, t = 0; into the intertemporal relation (2.11). The interest rate instrument of the central bank must satisfy i t = r n t at all times, where:
r n t is the natural rate of interest, which is de…ned as the equilibrium real rate of return in the case of fully ‡exible prices.
Figures 1-2 illustrate impulse responses of the ‡exible price equilibrium model to the oil and risk-premium shocks. It is worth noting that the ‡exible-price dynamics of the present model are fully equivalent to those of a RBC version of the current model considered in Kuralbayeva and Vines (2006) . The important di¤erence between a RBC model and the ‡exible-price limit of the model considered here, as pointed out by Woodford (2003) , is that product markets are competitive in the former, rather than monopolistically competitive in later case. In the RBC model, the marginal costs of production are the same for all …rms at all times, because inputs of production are purchased on the same competitive rental market. While, in the ‡exible price limit of the sticky price model, prices charged by …rms are the same, as well as the levels of production of each good, so that marginal costs are in fact the same for all …rms.
Flexible exchange rate regime
In this section we report results from simulations of the sticky-price model under a ‡exible exchange rate regime 25 . 2 5 In impulse responses functions pn denotes relative price of the non-traded goods, while Pn is aggregate price index of the non-traded goods, so that pn;t = Pn;t=Pt:
Oil shock
the reaction of the variables to the shock in the case of ! = 0:9:
A positive oil shock increases demand for both non-traded and traded goods. As in the non-traded sector prices are sticky and output is demand-determined, the …rms that are not able to reset prices increase output as long as their prices are above marginal costs. This pushes demand for labor up. As no imperfections exist in the labor market, the nominal wage must increase. Due to the price stickiness, this generates an increase in the real wage. As real marginal costs increase on the impact of the shock, lucky …rms (those able to reset their prices) …nd it pro…table to set a price above the average price of the previous period. In setting their price, forward-looking …rms, due to the 'front loading' behavior, also take into account the future expected changes in real marginal costs. So, the price set by lucky …rms is above the average price that prevailed in the previous period, which causes an increase in the price of non-traded goods and in ‡ation in that sector. This is very di¤erent from what happens if in ‡ation is almost entirely backward-looking. In that case the response of in ‡ation is hump shaped. The reason for such di¤erent adjustment of in ‡ation can be seen as follows. Because of the rule-of-thumb behavior, backward-looking …rms do not react contemporaneously to unexpected shocks. As a result, in ‡ation rises only slightly on the impact of the shock. But as real marginal costs rises in the non-traded sector and some (even very small) fraction of forward-looking …rms set prices higher than in previous periods, in ‡ation starts picking up in the non-traded sector in subsequent periods.
Under both cases the central bank accommodates the oil shock by increasing the (nominal) interest rate. The real interest rate also rises, given the Taylor principle. This monetary tightening helps to suppress demand, directly via the real interest rate e¤ect and indirectly via its e¤ect on the real exchange rate. Both of these e¤ects curb in ‡ation. There is a corresponding increase in the output gap, which causes additional monetary tightening and reinforces the interest rate e¤ect.
The nominal exchange rate appreciates on the impact of the positive demand shock. Thereafter, the higher interest rate results in a nominal depreciation of the exchange rate via the uncovered interest parity condition (UIP). The long-run depreciation of the nominal exchange rate is o¤set by an increase in the CPI price index of the same magnitude, so that in the long-run the real exchange rate moves back to its initial level. Thus, with an independent monetary policy the nominal exchange rate facilitates adjustment to the shock, which is re ‡ected in a smooth movement of the real exchange rate back to equilibrium level.
Two further points about the behavior of the real interest rate and in ‡ation are worth noting. First, in case of ! = 0:9; in ‡ation slowly increases and then converges to its steady state at a very slow speed as well. It seems to peak about eight quarters after the shock. Second, despite very di¤erent dynamic responses of in ‡ation and the (nominal) interest rate in the two cases, the real interest rate responses are very similar. This is because nominal interest rates closely follows the dynamics of in ‡ation, and hence the real interest rate reaction in case of the accelerationist Phillips curve has the same pattern of behavior as in the case of the forward-looking Phillips curve. So, both real interest rates rise on the impact of the shock and then gradually converge to zero in the long-run. Given similar variations in the real interest rate, it is not surprising that the reaction of real variables are very similar too. Moreover, those responses are much like that in the ‡exible price model. To see why it happens, consider the log-linearized version of the Euler equation (2.11):
Given the de…nition of the natural rate of interest, one observes that the log-linearized version of the Euler equation (4.2) can be re-written as:
The real interest rate that matters for the …rms in the non-traded sector is de…ned as b r t+1 = b i t+1 N;t+1 : Using the identity for aggregate in ‡ation, t+1 = N;t+1 (b p N;t+1 b p N;t ); the real interest rate faced by non-traded sector …rms can be related to the natural rate of interest in the following way:
where b p N;t is the log-linearized version of the relative price of the non-traded sector (p N;t = P N;t =P t ): As identity (4.4) reveals the only time when there is a considerable di¤erence between the real interest rate and the natural rate of interest is at the time of the shock, while at all other times the di¤erence b p N;t+1 (b p N;t+1 b p N;t ) remains very small. So, in this model variations in the monetary authority's instrument track variations in the natural rate of interest, so that the real interest rate faced by the non-traded sector …rms is approximately equal to the natural rate of interest throughout the adjustment period to the shock. As discussed in Woodford (2003) , such a Taylor rule policy, with characteristics above, would succeed in stabilizating in ‡ation. As a result, the ‡exible price equilibrium is replicated here in the sense that real variables respond to the oil shock in a similar way to reactions of variables in the ‡exible-price model. In general, as noted by Woodford (2003) , required variations in the natural rate of interest in response to the various types of shocks to replicate an equilibrium consistent with stable prices cannot be achieved through a simple Taylor rule. The assumption in our model, which is crucial in replicating the ‡exible price outcome, is ‡exibility of prices of traded goods. As shown in Smets and Wouters (2002), when prices of both sectors are sticky, there will be a trade-o¤ between stabilizing prices of domestic goods and stabilizing imported price in ‡ation. If one of these two sectors is ‡exible, it is optimal for the central bank to stabilize in ‡ation in the sector with sticky prices, and the ‡exible price equilibrium is replicated. This result is consistent with earlier work by Aoki (2001) , who also …nds within two-sector model (a ‡exible price and sticky price sector, but without in ‡ation inertia) that it is optimal to target in ‡ation in the sticky-price sector, rather than to target aggregate in ‡ation. When in ‡ation is completely stabilized, the responses of the economy are equivalent to those of the ‡exible price model.
Risk-premium shock
Figures 7-8 present the impulse responses of the model to the shock for the value ! = 0:01; while …gures 9-10 illustrate the reaction of the variables to the shock for the value of ! = 0:9:
A permanent reduction in the foreign interest rate reduces the marginal costs of capital. Lucky …rms (who are able to reset their prices) …nd it pro…table to set a price below the average price of the previous period, which causes disin ‡ation on the impact of the shock. In the case of backward-looking …rms, in ‡ation rate does not react to changes in current real marginal costs, so in ‡ation almost remains at its initial steady state level on impact of the shock.
After the initial response to the shock, in ‡ation declines before increasing towards its new steady state level for both values of !. This is because (real) marginal costs are falling in the periods following the shock and then are increasing towards the new long-run equilibrium level. To explain this dynamic adjustment of in ‡ation, we should notice that the outcome of the shortrun is an increase in the return on capital in both traded and non-traded sectors, with a bigger increase on capital pro…tability in the non-traded sector. 26 This rise of return on capital in the non-traded sector will cause capital in ‡ow into the sector.
During some period following the shock the non-traded sector modi…es the optimal mix of factors of production in favor of more capital and less labor, so production costs fall. Given the reduction in (real) marginal costs, the price of non-traded goods is falling during that period. However, as the wage rate has been rising throughout the adjustment period, pressures that were making in ‡ation fall will weaken. So, there will come a time when in ‡ation starts rising again (although remaining negative) towards its new long-run equilibrium level. This process is slower in the case of the accelerationist Phillips curve compared to the forward-looking Phillips curve, given the rule-of-thumb behavior of backward-looking …rms.
Note that in the long-run in ‡ation does not converge to its initial steady state level, which is di¤erent from the behavior of in ‡ation in the long-run in response to an oil shock. The reason is that we now consider a permanent risk-premium shock, which changes marginal costs of production.
As in ‡ation is negative throughout the adjustment period as well as in a new equilibrium, prices are falling permanently. Thus the real exchange rate appreciation occurs via appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, which o¤set the decline in the price level. Correspondingly, the burden of real exchange rate adjustment is taken by nominal exchange rate with smaller increase in prices. A permanent, 1 percentage reduction in the risk-premium assumes near 1 percent permanent decrease in the foreign interest rate on external borrowings by the country. In the long-run interest rate falls by 4.2 percentage points in case of ! = 0:01 and by 4.5 percentage points in case of ! = 0:9, the nominal exchange rate appreciates via the UIP condition with a constant rate of appreciation of 3.2 percent and 3.5 percent per quarter respectively.
As in the case of oil shock, the reaction of all real variables, for both values of !, are very similar to ones in the ‡exible price equilibrium. The intuition behind this result follows that of the oil shock discussed earlier.
Fixed exchange rate.
In this section we report results from similar simulations with a …xed exchange rate. The capital-mobility condition is then simply i t = i F t : Now a country must give up an independent monetary policy to keep the exchange rate …xed. Note that in this section we separate discussion of the simulation results for the case of a backward-looking Phillips curve from a forward-looking Phillips curve, as they are very di¤erent in the case of a …xed exchange rate regime.
Oil shock
Forward-looking Phillips curve (! = 0:01) There are two features of impulse response functions (IRFs) in the …xed exchange rate regime, compared to ‡exible exchange rate regime, which are worth noting. First, short-run reactions of real variables and in ‡ation are stronger in the …xed exchange-rate regime. Second, responses of real variables (except capital and investment in the non-traded sector) are hump shaped. The reason for such di¤erent propagation of the oil shock in the …xed exchange rate case can be seen as follows.
Given that the domestic interest rate is tied to the foreign rate and the fact that in ‡ation rises on the impact of the shock, there is no short-run increase in the real interest rate in the country, as there was when the exchange rate could adjust. In fact, the real interest rate declines. An initial drop in the real interest rate stimulates investment in the non-traded sector, and this is a reason for the stronger increase in investment in the non-traded sector in the …xed exchange rate regime.
From households'side, the spending e¤ect of a permanent rise in oil transfers is bigger in the …xed exchange rate case. Under a ‡exible exchange rate regime, the positive oil shock produces a considerable nominal appreciation, which has a signi…cant impact on the spending e¤ect of the shock. The spending e¤ect (and thus consumption) is lower in the ‡exible exchange rate case than in the …xed exchange rate because increased demand for domestic currency is partly met through changes in the nominal exchange rate.
Higher demand for non-traded goods in the …xed exchange rate case generates stronger demand for labor, which pushes wages higher compared with the ‡exible exchange rate case. As wages rises more, real marginal costs increase more and the prices set by lucky …rms are higher, which causes a bigger initial jump in in ‡ation in the …xed exchange rate case compared with the ‡exible exchange rate regime.
The initial e¤ects of the demand shock are larger on in ‡ation in case of a …xed exchange rate compared with a ‡exible exchange rate. This is because part of the adjustment takes place via a change in the nominal exchange rate if the exchange rate is ‡exible.
In order to examine adjustment dynamics in response to the shock, we focus on three key elements of the adjustment process: the real interest rate, the real exchange rate, and the nominal exchange rate. As we discussed earlier, the real interest rate falls on the impact of the shock, which puts upward pressure on output in the non-traded sector. However, forward-looking behavior implies that the real interest rate is expected to be higher in subsequent periods, as they know the long-run value of the price level and expect prices to fall. So, in ‡ation jumps up on the impact of the shock and then gradually falls as more and more price-setters adjust their prices to the new optimal level. The real interest rate is negative on the impact of the shock, but then starts rising, having a stabilizing e¤ect. Moreover, there is another stabilizing channel, coming from real exchange rate.
As in ‡ation remains positive throughout the adjustment period towards the long-run equilibrium level, the country's price level rises for some time and its real exchange rate declines (appreciates) for some time. This causes deterioration in net exports that results in a fall in demand for non-traded output. When demand falls low enough (precisely at the moment when the real interest rate returns to zero), prices start falling, and real exchange rate start depreciating. From here onwards, the dynamics of real variables are shaped by real exchange rate behavior only. Depreciation of real exchange rate will cause an improvement in net exports and that will cause an increase in the demand for non-traded output. Output increases gradually towards its long-run value. This explains the hump-shaped reaction of output in response to the shock. Similarly, hump-shaped responses of all other real variables are consequences of the same type of hump-shaped response of the real exchange rate. Such behavior of the real exchange rate is a result of the third channel of the adjustment process, or actually its absence: the nominal exchange rate. As discussed above, with an independent monetary policy with sticky prices, the nominal exchange rate carries out the burden of adjustment, resulting in a smooth response of the real exchange rate. In contrast, with a …xed exchange rate, prices do all the adjustment, which causes equivalent changes in the real exchange rate, re ‡ected in a less smooth reaction of the latter. But because prices are sticky, an equivalent change in the real exchange rate would not be quick and immediate. This results in the hump-shaped behavior of the real exchange rate. For example, if prices were ‡exible, then the …xed exchange rate would be irrelevant since the relative price adjustment could be achieved by changes in prices and the real exchange rate would display the same pattern of response as in the ‡exible price model.
Backward-looking Phillips curve (! = 0:9):
The main feature of adjustment when there is a high proportion of backward-looking …rms is that it is slow and cyclical. 27 The oscillations of the series of the non-traded sector are due to the evolution of backward-looking prices during the adjustment period towards steady state and the …xed exchange rate regime assumption. As we have seen above, backward-looking behavior does not modify signi…cantly the responses of the economy to the shocks in the case of a ‡exible exchange rate regime. However with commitment to the …xed exchange rate, the country gives up independent monetary policy and backward-looking behavior changes the adjustment dynamics of the economy to the shock considerably.
To understand oscillatory responses to the shock, as before, we focus on three key elements of the adjustment mechanism: the real interest rate, the real exchange rate, and the nominal exchange rate. As the output gap is positive on the impact of the shock, in ‡ation starts rising gradually (because of inertia) and the real interest rate starts falling for some time. This falling real interest rate would cause further output gains which could push prices further up and in turn cause the real interest rate to fall further, and so on. This could be destabilizing. This destabilizing real interest rate mechanism has become known as 'Walters critique', because of the name of Sir A. Walters, who drew attention to the potentially destabilizing real interest rate response at the time when the UK entered the ERM.
However, the real exchange rate channel outweights the destabilizing e¤ect coming from real interest rate movements. Temporary real appreciation, initially very sluggish, is great enough to stabilize the economy. Comparison of the paths of the real exchange rate in the face of oil shock in …gures 6 and 14 con…rms that the real exchange rate appreciates more in the case of a …xed exchange rate regime than in a ‡exible exchange rate case. So, real exchange rate appreciation reduces demand, by having a stronger e¤ect than the real interest rate and demand starts falling after initial increase.
In addition, the presence of forward-looking …rms (though a small proportion) can reinforce the stabilizing real exchange rate e¤ect on the economy. This is because forward-looking consumers know that, as prices of non-traded goods are anchored by the price level outside the country, and if prices rise they would need to fall again, which would in due course cause the real interest rate to increase again. That would lead them to reduce their expenditure and thus demand. Thus, forward-lookingness in price setting helps to prevent instability coming from the real interest rate channel. The higher proportion of forward-looking …rms, the lower consequences of the destructive Walters e¤ects and a more smooth adjustment path. That is why, in most earlier papers on monetary policy in small open economies the 'Walters critique'problems are absent, because these papers assume forward-looking wage and price setters.
A gradual rise in in ‡ation causes an increase in the price of non-traded goods, which will reach a level high enough to reduce demand and cause the output gap return to zero. However, at this point prices are still rising because of the rule-of-thumb behavior of backward-looking …rms. This will lead to a further decline in the demand for non-traded goods, which will cause a further fall in the output gap. The output gap falls substantially causing a fall in the price of non-traded goods, and thus leading to a decline in in ‡ation so that in ‡ation reaches its longrun equilibrium level. However, at this point the output gap is below its potential level, so with an accelerationist Phillips curve 28 it is necessary for the in ‡ation rate to fall further, and in ‡ation will start falling below the steady state level. This explains the oscillatory response of the economy to an oil shock in the case of a …xed exchange rate regime. As in the case of the forward-looking Phillips curve discussed earlier, in the absence of a 'shock absorbing'role of the nominal exchange rate, the real exchange rate facilitates adjustment to the shock, resulting in an oscillatory reaction.
It is necessary to note that the problem of adjusting to the external shocks in a small open economy with …xed exchange rate and with a high proportion of backward-looking consumers and investors is similar, in many respects, to the problems faced by a small open economy with high degree of backwardness in the Phillips curve in responding to shocks in the monetary union. Westaway (2003) examines the key adjustment mechanisms available for a country in face of shocks inside and outside of monetary union. Our paper, in may respects, follows the same line of analysis. For example, our …ndings agree with his results, which show that no cycles are ensuing in a country with an independent monetary policy. Similarly without an independent monetary policy, Westaway …nds that output and the real exchange rate would follow a more oscillatory path compared to outside.
Risk-premium shock
Forward-looking Phillips curve (! = 0:01)
The short-run e¤ects of the risk-premium shock is stronger in a …xed exchange rate regime compared with a ‡exible exchange rate. The intuition behind this result is similar to the case of the oil shock with a …xed exchange rate regime discussed earlier.
There is a stronger reaction of in ‡ation to the shock compared with a ‡exible exchange rate. It is also should be noted that in ‡ation behaves di¤erently in the long-run from what would happen if the exchange rate was ‡exible. In that case in ‡ation decreases in the new steady state. In the …xed exchange rate regime, in ‡ation converges to its initial steady state level. The reason is that to keep the exchange rate …xed, in the new steady state the domestic interest rate must fall by the magnitude of the shock to remain tied to the world interest rate, while in ‡ation anchored by the outside's in ‡ation, goes back to its initial level.
Backward-looking Phillips curve (! = 0:9): As in the case of an oil shock, a high proportion of backward-looking …rms implies an oscillatory reaction of variables of the non-traded sector. The responses of these variables are modi…ed by the rule of thumb behavior of backward-looking …rms and should be analyzed in the same way as in the case of the oil shock above. In contrast to the ‡exible exchange rate case, in ‡ation converges to its initial equilibrium level as the interest rate and in ‡ation are tied to the world interest rate and foreign in ‡ation in case of the …xed exchange rate.
Conclusion
The debate regarding the choice of exchange rate for an open economy has not yet been closed. In the presence of nominal rigidities, the conventional wisdom is that a ‡exible exchange rate regime is preferable to the …xed rate in the face of real shocks. A freely ‡oating exchange rate serves as a real shock absorber, accommodating the needed adjustment in the real exchange rate without major real e¤ects.
This paper attempts to shed light on one aspect of this debate. In a dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous in ‡ation persistence, we study the question of insulating properties of the alternative exchange rate regimes in response to terms of trade and riskpremium shocks. We show that the country's adjustment paths are slow and cyclical if there is a signi…cant backward-looking element in the in ‡ation dynamics with a …xed exchange rate. Such adjustment dynamics are moderated if there is a higher proportion of forward-looking price setters. In the case of an almost entirely forward-looking Phillips curve, the responses of variables become hump-shaped. The reason is that with a …xed exchange rate, prices do all the adjustment, which causes equivalent changes in the real exchange rate. But because prices are sticky, an equivalent change in the real exchange rate would not be quick and immediate. This results in the hump-shaped behavior of the real exchange rate as well as other real variables of the model. In contrast, with an independent monetary policy, a freely ‡oating exchange rate carries out the burden of adjustment, which results in a smooth response of the real exchange rate. Thus, a ‡exible exchange rate allows to escape in ‡ation persistence and achieves a smooth response of real variables.
By introducing endogenous in ‡ation persistence, we …nd support for the conventional wisdom regarding the insulating properties of a ‡exible exchange rate.
we focus on pricing implications. So, we think about breaking the …rm into two separate parts for planning purposes: production unit and pricing unit. First, the production unit takes, given the output level of the …rm and the rental price of capital and wage rate (each …rm operates under perfect competition in the inputs markets). Thus, each …rm j in the non-traded sector determines its labor and capital demand so as to minimize its total costs. Second, the pricing unit determines the price of the …rm's output, taking into account costs of production and demand conditions for the output.
To derive the …rst order consitions for …rms optimization problem we write Lagrangian for the …rm j in the non-traded sector as:
so the …rst order conditions are:
The lagrangian multiplier on the constraint is interpretable as nominal marginal cost, so f t = M C N;t (j); and (6.1)-(6.3) correspond to the following:
In the traded sector we assume perfect competition and ‡exible prices, so the cost of unit of production in that sector M C T;t = P T;t ; such as the counterpart of equations (6.4)-(6.6) in traded sector is:
R T;t = P T;t Y T;t K T;t (6.8)
Price setting by non-traded goods …rms
Firms in the non-traded sector set their prices as monopolistic competitors. Pricing behavior is taken as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Steinsson (2003) . We use Calvo (1983) sticky price speci…cation and assume that the …rm j changes its price with probability (1 N ):That is, each period there is a constant probability (1 N ) that the …rm will be able to change its price, independent of past history 29 . We also assume that if prices are not reset, the old price is adjusted by a steady state in ‡ation factor: N;t = P N;t =P N;t 1 (6.10)
Hence, even if the …rm is not allowed to change its price, the latter grows at the same rate as trend in ‡ation. Those who re-set a new price (with probability 1 N ), are split into backward-looking and forward-looking …rms, in proportion !, such that the aggregate index of prices set by the …rms is P As in Galì and Gertler, this rule of thumb has the following features: (1) in a steady state equilibrium the rule is consistent with optimal behavior, that is P B N = P F N ; (2) the price set in period t depends only on information dated t 1 or earlier.
Forward-looking price-setters
The problem of the …rm j changing price at time t consists of choosing price P new N;t (j) to maximize:
subject to the total demand it faces:
and where t+i is an appropriate stochastic discount factor, i N is the probability that the price P new N;t (j) set for good j still holds i periods ahead, and T C N;t+i (j) represents total (nominal) costs. The discount factor relates to the way how the households value their future consumption relative to the current consumption, and we de…ne the discount factor as: 2 9 Hence, the average time over which a price is …xed is given by (1 N )1+ N (1 N )2+:::
Thus, for example, with N = 0:75 in a quaterly model, prices are …xed on average for a year.
t C t Cost minimizing behavior of the …rm in non-traded sector yields the following expression for the total costs: T C N;t+i (j) = P N;t+i mc N;t+i Y N;t+i (j); where mc N;t+i = M C N t+i =P N;t+i represents real marginal costs.
The FOC of this maximization problem yields the following optimal price:
From (6.15) it is clear that all …rms that reset their prices in period t, set it at the same level, so P new N;t (j) = P new N;t ; for all j 2 [0; 1], and we could omit subscript j. If we de…ne two new variables
then (6.15) can be rewritten as:
Both P 1 N;t and P 2 N;t can be expressed recursively that does away the use of in…nite sums, such that:
Finally, it is necessary to note that the optimal price set by forward-looking …rms P F N;t P new N;t : To obtain formula for the price set by forward-looking …rms, we log-linearize expressions (6.16)-(6.18):
where p new N;t = P new N;t =P N;t ; p 1 N;t = P 1 N;t ; p 2 N;t = P 2 N;t P N;t : Substituting (6.21) and (6.22) into (6.23), we obtain the following formula for the forward-looking …rms:
where we turn to the notation b p new N;t b p F N;t :
Aggregate price in the non-traded sector
The price index in the non-traded sector is given by:
1= (1 ) (6.25)
which can be expressed as the average of all prices set i periods ago (in period t i) that still hold in period t:
1= (1 ) (6.26)
N is the fraction of …rms that last adjusted price (P r N;t i ) i periods ago. Using (6.11), expression in (6.26) can be rewritten recursively as:
Linearization of equation above yields:
where, as before, b p F N;t and b p B N;t denote percent deviations of P F N;t =P N;t and P B N;t =P N;t respectively, from their steady-state values of one.
Rule of thumb price-setters and Phillips curve
The rule of thumb price-setters use formula (6.12) to set the new price. The log-linearization of this equation straightforwardly yields:
where the log-linearized version of the index of prices set at date t 1 (b p r N;t 1 ) result of loglinearization of formula (6.11), and given by and b y N;t denotes percent deviation of Y N;t =Y n N;t from steady state value of one. So, now we have equation (6.24) that determines the price set by forward-looking …rms, equation (6.29) that determines the price set by backward-looking …rms and equation (6.28) , thus, by doing manipulations similar to Steinsson (2003) (A.1)-(A.6) , we eliminate b p F N;t 1 and b p N N;t 1 and obtain the following speci…cation of the Phillips curve:
Note that when ! = 0 then the Phillips curve collapses to the standard forward-looking speci…cation:
When ! = 1 then the Phillips curve takes the speci…cation:
Aggregation issue
In this subsection we focus on issues of aggregation in the non-traded sector. From cost minimization problem considered in the previous subsection we get:
Integrating second expression in (6.34) over all …rms, and de…ning
The production function for a given good j therefore becomes 30
which implies that aggregate supply in the non-traded sector is
The demand for each di¤erentiated good j is given by: 
so aggregate demand in the non-traded sector is given by:
is a measure of relative price dispersion in the non-traded good sector. The steady state value of the dispersion is unity, while o¤-steady state it always 1; and rises with the variance of nontraded prices. As the equation (6.40) shows the higher variability of prices, given aggregate nontraded goods output, there will less aggregate consumption of the non-traded goods. Combining idendities (6.38) and (6.40), the overall non-traded goods market equilibrium equation is:
where Y D N;t stands for aggregate demand of non-traded goods in the economy. Note that the aggregation introduces an additional term that deal with distribution of prices of non-traded goods. However, as shown by Yun (1996) so that dispersion can be re-written as:
As for the aggregate price level in the non-traded sector, this price aggregate admits a recursive representation
It can be easily seen that dispersion does not appear in the log-linearized version of the model. Log-linearization of aggregate price level of the non-traded sector, and the aggregate price index given by (6.45) yields the following expressions:
while the log-linearized version of the price dispersion t is
So, substracting expression (6.46) from (6.47), and using expression in (6.48), we get that
implying that if the economy is started from its steady state level, b t = 0 for all t, which we will consider hereafter. 
